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Instant Utilitarianism (Just add water!)

by: RobG

Tue Aug 26, 2008 at 10:43:45 AM UTC


(Another nice new discussion. - promoted by Seth Baum)

I've just read an interesting article on the political philosophy of John Rawls (http://tinyurl.com/578ba5). The article states that Rawls wrote his most famous work, A Theory of Justice, to overcome some of the problems of Utilitarianism. The example given in the article: "Suppose executing the Danish cartoonists will appease a Muslim mob, and that doing so increases total satisfaction. A utilitarian would have to endorse the execution."

This criticism of Utilitarianism, and all those of the same class, seem, in my opinion, to be fallacious. They arise because the criticisms often assume a sudden introduction and widespread acceptance of Utilitarianism by society at large, i.e, Instant Utilitarianism.  

RobG :: Instant Utilitarianism (Just add water!)
If we look at the example above, we can devise the following timeline:

t-1 A Danish cartoonist draws some satirical cartoons of Mohammad (PBUH).
t Utilitarianism is suddenly widely adopted.
t+1 The killing of this Danish cartoonist will increase total utility.

However, we must question why Utilitarianism was suddenly widely accepted and adopted at this point in the timeline? If it had occured at some point before t-1, it would have been right for the cartoonist, in a Utilitarian sense, to have never drawn the cartoon. It would also have been right for Muslims to develop and maintain less reactionary attitudess about pictorial depictions of their prophets.

As I've stated already, many counter-intuitive problems leveled against Utilitarianism seem to presume some form of Instant Utilitarianism (IU), a highly unlikely scenario that severely undermines such criticisms.

What are your opinions? Have any philosophers written about this topic?

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Re: Instant Utilitarianism (0.00 / 0)
Thanks for the question, RobG.

There may be examples in which Instant Utilitarianism is required to advance a reductio against utilitarianism (see, e.g., Hodgson's charge examined in this piece), but I'm not sure the Danish-cartoonist example is one of them. People don't have to be utilitarians in order to be happy about killing someone they abhor (indeed, utilitarians probably would not be happy about that!) in the same way that, say, chickens don't have to be utilitarians in order to enjoy being given food.

Your other points are well taken. As you say, if utilitarianism had been adopted at t-1, the cartoonist probably would not have drawn the cartoon. Still, if utilitarianism is the right goal system, it should hold up in all possible worlds. We might find ourselves in a world like the one you describe where it happens to be time t, and we can't go back and change things at t-1. Utilitarianism is still responsible for the answer it gives for making the best of the situation we find ourselves in at time t.


Post Format/Promotion (0.00 / 0)
RobG, before I put this on the front page, do you mind if I edit the post so that the text beginning "If we look at..." is in the extended text?  (See here for details.)  This is so the post doesn't take up too much space on the front page.  (We do the same for all the front page posts.)

Re-formatting (0.00 / 0)
Yes Seth, that's fine.

[ Parent ]
RE: Instant Utilitarianism (0.00 / 0)
The point here isn't to show a reason why widespread utilitarianism shouldn't be adopted. The point is to show why utilitarianism is incorrect. If there is a single possible universe is which a utilitarian action would be bad (given perfect knowledge beforehand), utilitarianism is false. This is supposed to be an example of something that, while obviously wrong, is what a utilitarian would do, and therefore proof that utilitarianism fails.

This strategy fails in that it requires that people have enough of an intuitive understanding of ethics that no action that is right would be obviously wrong. It is possible to show this is not the case by finding a possible universe in which no matter what action is taken, someone finds it obviously wrong. Ironically enough, this very thought experiment is one such example. The cartoonist thinks that executing the cartoonist is obviously wrong, but the extremist Muslims think NOT executing him is obviously wrong. You could say that no Muslim is that extreme, but you could still easily modify it by making what the cartoonist did worse and decreasing the punishment to make it still have that paradox. People also may argue that the Muslim extremists don't have good moral intuition and therefore don't count. This is a case of the overwhelming exeption fallacy, and the person using that argument can easily say that about anyone who strongly disagrees with them. It also has the problem that there's no way to say that they're not the ones with bad moral intuition.


It should be noted that this is an extremely unlikely scenario. It requires that the cartoonist and the extremist Muslims are all that are involved. Realistically, not executing the cartoonist to appease the non-Muslims would be a bigger priority.


This is about the government acting utilitarian, not about everyone being that way.


Reductio arguments (0.00 / 0)
It is possible to show this is not the case by finding a possible universe in which no matter what action is taken, someone finds it obviously wrong.

Right. But I think reductio arguments are directed toward particular individuals who hold particular moral beliefs about what should happen in various possible worlds, and it's perfectly possible for a theory to match intuition in all possible worlds. (Indeed, the "theory" that consists of an exhaustive enumeration of a person's intuition in every possible world is an example.)

Finding an ethical theory is like fitting a curve to (non-noisy) data points, where the "x axis" is possible worlds and the "y axis" is what is obviously morally right to do. In order to be the correct ethical theory held by some individual, a candidate curve must have the right y value for each x value. It doesn't matter that, for any x value, there exists a y value such that the curve misses that y value.


Re: Reductio arguments (0.00 / 0)
Well yes, if you only use one person.

If you believe that there is more than one person, but only one correct ethical theory, it doesn't make much sense.

If you're just trying to find someone's ethical theory, than it's just psychology. I think the argument was supposed to show that utilitarianism is wrong, not just that the reader isn't a utilitarianism.


[ Parent ]
Universal ethical theory (0.00 / 0)
If you're just trying to find someone's ethical theory, than it's just psychology.

Indeed.

If you believe that there is more than one person, but only one correct ethical theory [...].

But didn't you point out that this is impossible above?


It is possible to show this is not the case by finding a possible universe in which no matter what action is taken, someone finds it obviously wrong.

For any candidate moral theory, we can find a possible universe in which someone objects, in which case that moral theory can't be universally right, in that sense at least.

[ Parent ]
Re: Universal ethical theory (0.00 / 0)
I was showing that it is trivial to find a case in a given moral theory where people will object, therefore finding an obscure case where people will object to a given theory is not evidence against it. You seem to have assumed that that would be proof against it, and therefore one of my axioms (the one about there being exactly one correct ethical theory) was wrong.

A person's ethical theory is what they believe is universally true. Only one ethical theory can be universally true, and it doesn't have to be anyone's. If there is no universally true ethical theory, or, more accurately, if the universally true ethical theory is nihilism, then it doesn't matter if you're wrong. On the other hand, if it isn't nihilism, then it's probably good to be right. Given that, it's best to assume that there is a universally true ethical theory.

My attempt at meta-ethics resulted in nihilism. It is one of two philosophical ideas that I logically think are true, but I can't believe and I willfully ignore. The other one is that qualiphilia is an artifact of conscious thought, memory, or some combination thereof, and even if anything like it is true there would be no way to know and our belief in it would be purely coincidental.


[ Parent ]
Daniel/Duffman's wager. Preference utilitarianism (0.00 / 0)
that's right.

There are many ethical opinions. Whether there is an ethical truth is yet to be decided.

If no ethical opinions are correct (nihilism), then our actions are of no consequence.

If all ethical opinions are correct (a strong form of moral relatavism/subjectivism) or if one ethical opinion is correct (moral objectivism), then our actions are of consequence.

Obviously, it's analogous to Pascal's wager. If the nihilists are correct, then ethical behaviour is ethically neutral. If not, ethical behaviour is more likely than not to be valuable. Hence we should behave as if we know nihilists are incorrect. Until we find out who first published the idea, we can call it Daniel/Duffman's wager.

PS. I suppose preference utilitarianism could be recast as the position that behaviour must be guided by the average of all ethical opinions.


[ Parent ]
Multiple theories (0.00 / 0)
How could more than one be correct? You can't have a situation where A is better than B and B is better than A, can you?

You can't even average (or add) all ethical theories. There are several completely incompatible ethical sets of theories.

Also, preference utilitarianism is completely different than moral relativism. In the latter, you do stuff based on what people think is right. In the former, as I pointed out, you change people's preferences to fit with the universe. Even if you ignore that, the former is consequentialist and the latter tends to be more deontologist (I think).


[ Parent ]
relativism and preference util (0.00 / 0)
How could more than one be correct? You can't have a situation where A is better than B and B is better than A, can you?

I should have said 'all ethical theories are correct for that person'. i.e. it's correct for abortions to occur and simultaneously it's correct for people to kill the doctors who carry abortions out. I think that other forms of moral relativism are even less defensible than this.

You can't even average (or add) all ethical theories. There are several completely incompatible ethical sets of theories.

I suppose it depends what what you understand by 'ethical opinion' compared with 'preference'. Do you think you can average all preferences, because in my view, averaging preferences is what underlies preference utilitarianism.

That would be my understanding of preference utilitarianism and moral relativism


[ Parent ]
Doesn't the objection miss the point? (0.00 / 0)

One comes up against this kind of objection to utilitarianism all the time. But don't they just miss the point?

 Surely they basically say: Although your moral system appears to be correct, it comes to a conclusion which appears reprehensible under my former moral system and thus must be false'?

 Take this example. It may be true that killing the cartoonists would create a net happiness gain. I strongly suspect it isn't, for all sorts of reasons (the fear it would cause other journalists, the fact that pandering to death threats causes more in the future, etc. etc.) but if one tweaked the example a bit it might turn out to be true. Anyway, let's assume it is, for the purpose of argument.

 So what? On what grounds should we not kill the journalists (assuming it is utilitarian to do so)? On the grounds that it 'feels wrong'? - hardly a rational basis. On the grounds that it violates their 'rights' - simply deontological morality. Unless the anti-utilitarian can disprove the line of reasoning that brought the utilitarian to this conclusion, they must accept it. But one can't object to the theoretical basis of an ethical philosophy on the grounds that it comes to conclusions that one disagrees with based upon a different ethical philosophy.

Of course utilitarianism will prove some things that are different to what people currently believe! If it didn't there wouldn't be any point in it. The fact that utilitarianism proves things that are wrong under deontological systems has no effect on whether it's correct or not.

 

Incidentally, all the posts here seem to be from some months ago - does anyone actually post anymore?



Re: Forum (0.00 / 0)
Hi Nathaniel. You're right that the posts here are mostly several months old; activity has largely moved to the new forum page except for responses to old posts.

[ Parent ]
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